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hen a private creditor seeks to collect from low-income people, its priorities are clear: obtain as much money as possible as fast as possible. Many
low-income people and their advocates therefore may expect that state
food stamp agencies’ efforts to collect food stamp claims are similarly single-minded. In fact, states are responding to a much more complex set of pressures. Food
stamp claims are not debts to states: most or all of the money collected goes to the
federal government. Although the Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) pushes states to establish and collect claims, this pressure is
not nearly as strong, and the consequences of states’ failures are not nearly as severe,
as those associated with food stamp quality control (QC). Moreover, even the Food
and Nutrition Service’s goals are more complex than those of a typical private creditor. True, the Food and Nutrition Service feels a responsibility to collect on federal
debts entrusted to its oversight. However, it has faced intense criticism for carrying
large uncollected claim balances on its books.1 Outstanding balances can be reduced
either through collection or by writing off claims. More broadly, the agency seeks to
make states’ claims collection systems more efficient and cost-effective.2
In this article I survey the options that states have under federal regulations to adopt
claims collection policies that reduce hardship for current and former food stamp
recipients and the arguments that advocates may mobilize to encourage their states to
implement those options.3
I.

The Food and Nutrition Service’s July 2000 Food Stamp
Claims Regulations

On July 6, 2000, the Food and Nutrition Service promulgated new rules concerning
food stamp claims.4 Although one purpose of these regulations was to implement the
claims provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, the new rules went much farther. In completely rewriting
the Food Stamp Program’s long-standing claims regulations, the Food and Nutrition
Service added new dimensions to the goals of the claims process. The regulations also
1David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare
Law, 79 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1271, 1303 (2004).
2“We aim to strike the optimal balance among various competing goals including program integrity, fiscal accountability, practical claim management, and the rights of individuals and households.” Food Stamp Program: Recipient Claim
Establishment and Collection Standards, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 41752, 41753 (July 6, 2000).
3The checklist at the end of this article consists of questions to ask when representing individuals with alleged food stamp
overissuances. For a discussion of opportunities for advocacy for individual clients with alleged food stamp claims, see
Jonathan Givner & Gary Smith, Overpaid but Underfed: The Revised Regulations Regarding Overpayment Collection in the
Federal Food Stamp Program, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 697 (March–April 2001).
4Food Stamp Program, supra note 2.
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give states new flexibility to tailor their
claims collection with the goal of creating
highly efficient debt management systems. Many states still operate under
essentially the same policies and procedures that they followed under the former, less flexible, regulations.
Rules governing claims collection operated in a manner analogous to certification policy. Many aspects of certification
policy have been prescribed at the federal level and focused on precisely calculating each household’s new benefit amount
with little regard to the administrative
cost of doing so. The claims process was
largely governed by federal regulations,
leaving few important decisions to states.
States were expected to pursue most
claims with little regard to whether that
was the most efficient approach. The primary means of recovering claims was
recoupment of ongoing benefits—effectively reducing the cost of the program to
the federal government. States had little
discretion about which claims to pursue,
and the rules made little allowance for
individual circumstances.
Just as certification has become more
flexible and more attuned to reducing
administrative burdens on state agencies
and households, so, too, has claims policy. The new rules on claims abandon the
idea that claims collection’s goal is to
achieve mathematical perfection in the
allocation of benefits. Instead states are
asked to develop and to follow a model of
collections akin to that used in privatesector businesses. Each state is expected
to develop and implement an efficient
machinery for moving claims from
detection to final disposition. The content of that process, however, is largely up
to states.5 The Food and Nutrition
Service now is less concerned about the
details of states’ systems on claims than it
is about states having a meaningful busi-

ness strategy that governs the states’ systems. The agency stresses that the goal “is
to ensure efficient and effective claims
referral management while maximizing
State agency flexibility.6” This strategy
can, and is expected to, incorporate waiver and compromise policies that increase
the efficiency of the system and that can
have the added benefit of serving lowincome households. The agency declares
that “we do not regulate the type or
amount of claim that can or cannot be
compromised.”7 The agency’s more
pragmatic outlook offers opportunities to
advocate more moderate policies on state
claims.
For example, private businesses can and
do write off large numbers of claims
against customers when collection would
be cost-ineffective or when other business reasons call for ceasing collections.
In the same vein, the Food and Nutrition
Service’s new rules give states far more
flexibility to determine which claims to
pursue and which to abandon. In approving state plans under the new rules, the
Food and Nutrition Service shows a great
willingness to defer to states’ judgments
about which claims to pursue and which
to abandon. The rules’ clear priority is
not maximizing collections but rather
maintaining an efficient and effective
claims process. States can effectively
argue that disposing of relatively small
claims makes sound business sense.
Yet, with all of the other changes in food
stamp policy that they have been implementing over the past few years, most
states have not explored in depth the
options under the new regulations on
claims. Since many states have now completed implementing the 2002 Farm Bill,
advocates may succeed in persuading
them to reexamine some of the new
options on claims.

5“To accomplish this, we need to afford State agencies a certain degree of flexibility while maintaining enough control
to ensure effective claims management.” Id. at 41753–54.
6Id. at 41758.
7Transcript of remarks of Tim O’Connor, Acting Director, Program Accountability Division, Food and Nutrition Service, U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Center for Law and Social Policy Audio Conference (May 2, 2000), at 6. The Food and
Nutrition Service had proposed restrictions in this area but in its final rule “decided to delete this proposal and allow State
agencies to continue to compromise any claim.” 65 Fed. Reg. at 41764.
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In the following sections I identify ways
that the options under the regulations on
claims can help states address policy
concerns. I focus on how the new options
allow states to reduce burdens on their
often overstretched staffs, redesign
claims policy to reinforce rather than
undercut states’ other programmatic
goals, and improve their claims performance as measured under the Food and
Nutrition Service’s standards.
II. State Options to Reduce Burdens
on State Agency Staffs

With the continuing state budget crisis,
many agencies’ staffs are strained to, or
beyond, the breaking point. Administrators
have little ability to augment their dedicated claims staff. States are leery of imposing
on frontline eligibility workers additional
burdens that can distract them from meeting processing standards and payment
accuracy goals. Transferring responsibilities for identifying and establishing claims
from eligibility workers to central office
staff may be difficult to manage and may
cause errors that lead to costly requests for
fair hearings. USDA’s interest in improving
the efficiency of claims processing thus
comes at a crucial time for many states.
Under the new rule, states need not pursue a claim that is below the Food and
Nutrition Service cost-effectiveness criteria of $125.8 States also have significant
flexibility to set their own cost-effectiveness criteria.9 To date, few states have
taken advantage of this discretion. In
USDA’s North East Region, however, several states have approved plans going well
beyond the standards in the federal rules.
For example, Maine does not establish

claims under $200 against participating
households. Connecticut does not establish claims under $500 against nonparticipating households. And New York City
applies a $500 cost-effectiveness standard
in establishing claims against both participating and nonparticipating households.10
Missouri also is a leader in this area.
Relying upon a methodology in a Food
and Nutrition Service study in the 1990s,
that state’s food stamp agency determined that establishing claims cost an
average of $60; collecting against nonrecipient households—when possible—cost
an additional $30, but only one in five
such claims could be collected. 11
Accordingly Missouri finds it cost-effective to establish only claims of $450 or
more against households not currently
receiving food stamps.12
When setting their own cost-effectiveness
criteria, states may want to establish different cost-effectiveness thresholds for establishing claims depending on the cause of
the overissuance. Arguably the costliest
type of claim to pursue is one resulting from
an agency error. Households with agencyerror overissuances are more likely to
become indignant when the state proposes
recoupment and more likely to request a
costly fair hearing. Both Maryland and
Virginia have cost-effectiveness thresholds
that are more than twice as high for agencyerror claims as for those resulting from
fraud or inadvertent household errors.
States also may want to consider setting
higher cost-effectiveness thresholds for
inadvertent household-error claims than
for those resulting from fraud. The risk of a
hearing request, and a reversal, is higher in
an inadvertent household-error case;

87 C.F.R. § 273.18(e)(2)(ii) (2005).
9Id. § 273.18(e)(2)(i).
10Responses to David A. Super, Questions for FNS Regional Office on State Claims Procedures from the North East
Regional Office (July 8, 2003) (on file with Super).
11See MYLES MAXFIELD, OPTIMAL THRESHOLDS IN THE COLLECTION OF FOOD STAMP PROGRAM CLAIMS (1996), available at
www.nal.usda.gov/foodstamp/FOODSTAMPREPORTS/FSP-241.PDF.
12Family Support Division, Missouri Department of Social Services Income Maintenance Memo No. 100, Changes to Food
Stamp Claims Procedures (Sept. 28, 2004), available at www.dss.state.mo.us/dfs/iman/memos/memos_04/im100_04.html.
Missouri multiplies its 20 percent collection rate by its $90 average total costs of collection to reach $450. Since Missouri may
collect claims through recoupment from virtually all current recipients, its cost-effectiveness threshold for those claims is only the
$60 average establishment costs. Once Missouri decides not to establish a claim against a given household, however, it does
not reverse its decision if the household returns to food stamps: doing so would entail costly record keeping that would defeat
the purpose of the cost-effectiveness standard.
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Ordinarily, however, states can pursue
these goals in harmony. Providing the
maximum benefits legally permissible to
households that deal with the program
honestly can accentuate the difference
between them and those households that
engage in fraud. This both helps meet the
honest households’ food needs and sends
a clearer message to all households about
States should note that one option under the importance of program integrity.
the regulations actually increases the burdens on their staff and should be viewed Federal regulations do not permit a state
with caution. The regulations allow states to simply to ignore claims against honest
resume collection of terminated or written- households resulting from their inadveroff claims when new collection opportuni- tent errors or from the errors of the state
ties become available (e.g., the recipient agency. Those regulations do, however,
returns to the Food Stamp Program or give a statewide latitude to compromise
receives other federal benefits that may be or waive claims to ameliorate the impact
attached).13 The chances of significant col- of collecting from households with nonlections through this option are question- fraud claims.15 These options include
able. Having terminated or written-off compromising claims to avoid hardship,
claims suddenly come back to life, however, distinguishing between current and foris likely to pose workload management mer recipients, and reducing claims to
problems for a claims unit. This can com- the amounts that households can repay in
plicate states’ efforts to process more cur- three years.
rent claims efficiently.14
because the events giving rise to a fraud
claim already were established in the disqualification hearing, much less remains
open to contest in those cases. Establishing
fraud claims serves deterrence policies that
are absent when the household did not
know that it was violating the program’s
rules.

III. State Options to Allow Policies
on Claims to Support Other
Program Priorities

The claims process implicates two
important policies that states pursue in
their administration of the Food Stamp
Program generally. First, states stress
program integrity and the importance of
claimants honestly disclosing their circumstances. Second, states operate the
Food Stamp Program to help ensure that
low-income households have sufficient
nutrition, that they are food-secure. At
times, such as when a member of a
household in severe need commits an act
that requires disqualification from the
program, these purposes can conflict.

A. Compromising Claims Based on
Hardship or Inability to Pay

Federal rules allow states to establish standards for compromising claims based on
the inability to pay.16 More generally, federal rules give states broad authority to
compromise any claim.17 Although many
approaches are possible, one well-tested
policy is the Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) Program’s policy on waiving claims.
In its preamble to the new regulations on
claims, the Food and Nutrition Service
describes this policy and notes that applying it is within states’ discretion.
In SSI, a claim may be waived if:
(a) The overpaid individual was
without fault in connection with
the overpayment, and

137 C.F.R. § 273.18(e)(8)(ii)(G) (2005).
14Under Stone v. Hamilton, 308 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2003), states may not recoup agency-error claims that arose prior to
the 1996 welfare law. Any state contemplating a procedure for reviving old claims would need a mechanism to ensure
its compliance with Stone.
15USDA’s authority to settle, compromise, or deny claims springs from 7 U.S.C. § 2022(a)(1) (2000). This authority
includes the power to waive claims if the secretary determines that to do so would serve the purposes of the Food Stamp
Act. Id. USDA has delegated this authority to waive or compromise claims to the states. 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.3, 271.4(b)
(2005).
167 C.F.R. § 273.18(e)(3)(M), (7) (2005).
17Id. § 271.4(b).
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(b) adjustment or recovery of
the overpayment would either:
(1) defeat the purpose of the
SSI program; or
(2) be against equity and
good conscience; or
(3) impede efficient or
effective administration of
the SSI program due to the
small amount involved.18
The Food and Nutrition Service recognizes the “merit” of public comments
recommending that states be required to
apply this policy in food stamps and
acknowledges that such an approach is
allowable under food stamp regulations.
Rather than require this approach, the
agency leaves the decision of how to compromise claims up to the states.19
Several states have tailored and supplemented the SSI approach to fit the Food
Stamp Program’s goals and their own
administrative needs. Rhode Island has a
compromise policy in the spirit of the SSI
example.20 It focuses on the ability to pay
and on whether paying would cause financial, physical, or mental hardship.
Nevada’s hardship policy waives claims
permanently where the household faces
hardship. Among the conditions that may
support such a finding are “Medical hardship which compromises the client’s ability to repay the debt[, c]ollection would
jeopardize the client’s ability to provide
shelter/housing and other basic necessities for immediate family members
(dependents)[, or the household having
g]ross income [that] is less than 100% of
the federal poverty income guidelines.”21
Oregon considers requests to compromise
claims to avoid hardship if the cost of

administration and collection of the full
amount is more than the current balance,
if the claimant’s ability to pay the remaining balance is low because the claimant’s
income is less than twice the federal
poverty income guidelines or the
claimant’s income and liquid resources
are small relative to the remaining balance, or if the claim resulted from an
administrative error, an inadvertent
household error, or circumstances beyond
the claimant’s control.22
Whatever policy a state adopts, it should
issue clear compromise criteria to its eligibility workers and claims staff. Being
accustomed to certification policy, which
endeavors to give a single correct answer
to each potential problem, staff naturally
would be reluctant to apply broadly discretionary compromise and waiver policies. Any waiver decision inevitably has
some subjective elements, but a clear
standard such as the one for SSI waivers
or these states’ formula will be most
effective.
Having no waiver policy at all is not a
desirable option. The Food and Nutrition
Service’s regulations still require the
state to notify households about the
state’s waiver authority.23 Clients are
likely to be confused and resentful
toward workers and claims staff if they
seek waivers only to discover that no
waivers are granted. Moreover, in Bliek v.
Palmer, the Eighth Circuit held that due
process principles required a state to
inform recipients that it had the discretion to waive, reduce, or settle a claim.24
In particular, the court held that recipients with agency-error overissuances
“who depend on the state to help them
meet their basic nutritional needs and

1865 Fed. Reg. at 41752, 41,765.
19Id.; see Ellender v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (discussing the Supplemental Security Income waiver
process).
20Super, supra note 10.
21Division of Welfare and Supportive Services, Nevada Department of Health and Human Services, Eligibility and
Payments Manual, Manual Transmittal Letter No. 01/19 29 (Oct. 1, 2001), www.welfare.state.nv.us/elig_pay/epm_manual/f_100.pdf.
22Oregon Department of Human Services, Family Services Manual, ch. 13(C)(3)(I), www.dhs.state.or.us/policy/selfsufficiency/em_firstpage.htm.
237 C.F.R. § 273.18(e)(3)(iv)(M) (2005).
24Bliek v. Palmer, 102 F.3d 1472 (8th Cir. 1997).
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recoupment amount.28 These regulations recognize that little useful purpose
is served by continuing to collect from a
household after three years. Apart from
the most serious cases of fraud, penalties
in the Food Stamp Program generally end
well short of three years. After that length
of time, the household may not even
remember just what occasioned the
overissuance in the first place. Here
again Maine, New Hampshire, and other
B. Distinguishing Between
North East Region states have taken
Current and Former Recipients
advantage of the option to focus their
States may select separate compromise attention on more current claims.
and waiver standards for current recipients (who are subject to recoupment) and IV. State Options to Improve
the State’s Ratings for
those not now receiving food stamps (but
Claims Performance
who may be subject to tax refund intercepts and other means of collection).
Although collecting from current recipi- Under the Food and Nutrition Service’s
ents obviously is easier, the fact that they prior policy, the sole goal of the claims
still qualify for food stamps indicates that process was collection. A state that collected a large amount was considered a
they are at risk of food insecurity.
high performer no matter how ineffiFormer recipients may be better able to ciently or haphazardly its process operatpay. Some have earnings and could be ed. States derived no advantage from
owed income tax refunds that the waiving or expunging old claims; as a
Treasury Offset Program can intercept. result, the program built up a huge and
One large tax intercept can produce more growing backlog of claims on which no
collections than several years of monthly collection action was pending. USDA’s
recoupments and can do so without Office of the Inspector General and conaffecting a household’s monthly food gressional overseers saw this backlog of
unresolved claims as an indication that
budget.26
the Food Stamp Program was sloppily
C. Compromising All Nonfraud
administered. 29 They pointed out that
Claims at the Amount that a
well-run private businesses did not
Household Can Pay Within
maintain large outstanding balances of
Three Years
collectibles: they collected them, comFederal rules allow states to compromise promised them, or wrote them off.
claims that may not be collected within Responding to these criticisms, the Food
three years.27 Thus, if a household is and Nutrition Service’s July 2000 rules
participating, the state may compromise fundamentally changed the claims process
or waive the amount of the claim that by expanding its goals. The primary purexceeds thirty-six times the monthly
who have justifiably relied on the accuracy
of past food stamp issuances … have a significant interest in being fully informed of
the state’s authority to settle the claim so
that they might ask the state to exercise its
authority either before or at the fair hearing.”25 The court rejected the state’s
argument that it had made a policy decision not to grant any waivers under its
discretion.

25Bliek, 102 F.3d at 1477.
26To be sure, many of the tax refunds that the Treasury Offset Program intercepts result from the earned income tax credit (EITC), which is also an important income support for low-wage working families. Intercepting an EITC may force a
household to postpone important purchases or efforts to pay off accumulated bills. It does not, however, directly affect
the household’s ability to purchase sufficient food each month.
27 7 C.F.R. § 273.18(e)(7)(i) (2005).
28Allotment reduction for agency-error claims and inadvertent household-error claims is limited to the greater of $10 or
10 percent of a household’s allotment. 7 U.S.C. § 2022(b)(3) (2000). Over a thirty-six-month period, the state can estimate that it will collect the greater of $360 or 360 percent of a household’s monthly allotment.
29See note 1, supra.
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pose of these new regulations is to make
the food stamp claims system more efficient, applying some of the principles of
large private businesses. The Food and
Nutrition Service hopes and expects that
greater efficiency will increase overall collections. The priority, however, is to show
good stewardship of public resources by
taking prompt and decisive action, one way
or the other, on all claims. Thus a state
with large collections but a huge, unmanaged backlog of claims can expect no better than a mixed review from the agency.
By contrast, a state that compromises or
waives many relatively unproductive
claims to focus its energies on collecting
those that remain is following the
agency’s model much more faithfully.
Advocates who understand how the
agency evaluates states’ claims performance can develop proposals that will both
help many households and improve the
state’s ratings.
The Food and Nutrition Service’s rules
give it broad discretion to evaluate states’
performance in pursuing claims.30 In
practice, it evaluates states each federal
fiscal year based on seven different
ratios:
■

claims collected to the state’s projected
overissuances for that year;

■

claims referred to the Treasury Offset
Program to total outstanding balance of
claims.32

This system differs sharply from the traditional food stamp QC system—the Food and
Nutrition Service’s primary method of
assessing state performance on program
integrity. First, a state rated poorly faces no
fiscal penalties. Instead the Food and
Nutrition Service asks the state to work to
improve its performance in problem areas.
Indeed, the agency may not legally base fiscal penalties on its claims performance ratings because they have not been promulgated as rules under the Administrative
Procedure Act.33
Second, these measures are not designed
to criticize states close to the national
average. The Food and Nutrition Service
divides the states into five quintiles on
each of these six criteria. States in the
fourth or fifth quintile on any one of
these criteria are asked to find ways of
improving their performance in that
area. Although this still means that twenty states are being asked to improve in
each area each year, it does not mean that
states need to rise above the national
average to score satisfactorily on a given
measure.

And, third, the claims evaluation system
claims collected to the state’s projected offers a much more nuanced appraisal of
overissuances for the immediately pre- states’ performance. Instead of, in effect,
rating states as “good” or “bad” the way
ceding fiscal year;
QC does, these measures recognize the
■ claims established to the state’s projecttrue variety of state performances. Most
ed overissuances for that year; 31
states score well on some measures and
■ claims established to the state’s total lower on others. All but six states were
found in need of improvement in at least
food stamp issuance for that year;
one area of claims activity in fiscal year
■ claims collected to claims established for 2003, the most recent for which data are
that year;
available; two of those six states had been
cited the previous year. Conversely the
■ claims collected to the state’s total outFood and Nutrition Service found only
standing balance of claims; and
one state in need of improvement in all
■

307 C.F.R. § 273.18(a)(3), (d)(2) (2005).
31A claim is considered established when the state sends a household a notice alleging the claim, and the household
acknowledges the debt, fails to request a hearing, or requests a hearing but loses. A state’s overissuances are projected
from the overissuances established through the food stamp quality control (QC) system.
32Memorandum from Karen J. Walker, Director, Program Accountability Division, USDA, to Directors, Food Stamp
Program, All Regions (Sept. 22, 2004) (on file with David A. Super).
33Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).; see 7 U.S.C. § 2013(c) (2000) (requiring USDA to follow
notice-and-comment rule making when setting standards in the Food Stamp Program).

Clearinghouse REVIEW Journal of Poverty Law and Policy

■

September–October 2005

355

Encouraging Moderation in State Policies on Collecting Food Stamp Claims

areas. Thus, although the agency finds
something to criticize about almost every
state each year, the agency also notes
accomplishments of almost every state
each year. The profusion of measures and
the near certainty of both good and bad
scores effectively give states considerable
flexibility.
Policy changes to improve a state’s performance on one measure can hurt a state
on others. In particular, increasing the
amount of claims that a state establishes
will help on some measures but hurt on
others. Thus, for example, when Hawaii
improved its claims establishment from
2002 to 2003, it improved on some
measures but fell into the bottom quintile on its ratio of claims collected to
those established.
A state can, however, clearly improve its
rating under these formulas by taking any
of three steps: (1) reducing its QC error
rate; (2) increasing collections; or (3)
reducing its outstanding balances by collecting, compromising, or waiving claims.
Improvements in error rates appear to be
the single most important cause of
improvements in states’ claims performance ratings. Of the three ways of achieving unambiguously better ratings, the
amount of claims compromised or waived
is the most readily within the state’s control. For example, New Mexico achieved a
45 percent reduction in its outstanding
balance in a single year, primarily through
compromise and waiver.34 In addition to
improving the state’s standing under the
sixth and seventh measures above, an
aggressive policy of compromise and

waiver can free up the state agency’s claims
staff to improve collections and certification staff to improve the state’s error rate.
All ratios are calculated in terms of dollars; establishing and collecting one
$3,000 claim gives the state as much
credit as establishing and collecting ten
$300 claims but is almost certainly less
work and less costly. The ratios also do
not differentiate among fraud, inadvertent household error, and agency-error
claims.35 Nationally the average amount
of fraud claims is far greater than that of
inadvertent household-error claims; that
amount in turn is considerably larger
than the typical agency-error claim.36 A
state that sets a higher cost-effectiveness
threshold for establishing nonfraud
claims, and a more generous policy for
compromising and waiving those claims,
reduces the number of outstanding claims
far more than the amount of those claims.
This frees up more staff resources to
increase the collection of the remaining
claims while foreclosing relatively little
in potential collections. Households that
engage in fraud also may be more likely to
have substantial employment and hence
qualify for large tax refunds that can be
intercepted through the Treasury Offset
Program. A senior Food and Nutrition
Service official says that “many times it is
important for program integrity to give
priority to fraud and larger claims. We
have no problem with and even encourage States to address these claims differently when submitting any claim referral
plans.37
■

■

■

34State Operations Branch, Program Accountability Division, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, FY 04 Claims Standard (unpublished spreadsheet on file with David A. Super). At the beginning for the 2002 fiscal year, New Mexico’s outstanding claim balance was $9 million. Over the course of the year, it collected about $1 million, a drop of 36 percent from 2001 and only about
three quarters as much as the new claims it established that year. Nonetheless, it preserved its rating on the collections to outstanding balance measure by writing off $4.5 million in claims.
35States are, however, allowed to retain 35 percent of what they collect from fraud claims, 20 percent of collections of inadvertent household error claims, and none of agency error claims. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(a) (2000).
36One study performed for the Food and Nutrition Service found that only 2 percent of participating households were ineligible for food stamps. On average, overpaid eligible households receive $65 more in food stamps than they should have. This has
the effect of raising the combined total of their income and food stamps from 79 percent of the poverty line to 85 percent of
the poverty line. CAROLE TRIPPE & CATHERINE PALERMO, MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, FOOD STAMP PAYMENT ERRORS: HOW BIG ARE THEY,
WHAT IS THEIR IMPACT, AND WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT HOUSEHOLDS WITH THESE ERRORS? (2000). Thus, in most cases, the overissued
benefits went to extremely needy households. A more recent study of somewhat larger errors found that they, too, went overwhelmingly to households below or near the poverty line. OFFICE OF ANALYSIS, NUTRITION, AND EVALUATION, FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE,
IMPACT OF FOOD STAMP PAYMENT ERRORS ON FOOD STAMP PURCHASING POWER (2005), available at www.fns.usda.gov/oane/
MENU/Published/FSP/FILES/ProgramIntegrity/HouseholdWell-Being.pdf.
37O’Connor, supra note 7, at 6.
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The Food and Nutrition Services new
rules on claims seek a more efficient
claims process, but not necessarily a
harsher or more burdensome one. The
Food and Nutrition Service makes clear
that it wants states to set policy on claims
and to operate in accordance with that
policy. However, it gives states broad latitude in formulating that policy. The
agency does not want cases languishing
due to inattention or negligence, but it
makes clear that states have broad discretion to establish policies that sort and
filter claims so that states can focus their
limited resources on high-priority cases.
To date, most states have barely scratched
the surface of the options available to
streamline how they process claims. With

the initial round of Farm Bill implementation winding up and their budgets and staff
remaining under severe pressure, this is an
opportune time for states to reshape their
policies on claims to suit their resources
and policy preferences better.
Author’s Note

This article is based on research that I conducted when I was general counsel of the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. It has
benefited from additional research by the
center’s food stamp policy analyst Colleen
Pawling and its former intern Ray Horng. I
am grateful for the comments of Stacy Dean,
Colleen Pawling, and Dottie Rosenbaum on
earlier versions of this article.

Food Stamp Overissuance Checklist
1. Is there an overissuance? Did the payment in

question result from the household or the food
stamp office violating food stamp regulations? If
not, there is no overissuance. 7 C.F.R. § 273.18(b).
Similarly, if the claim is based on alleged trafficking, is the food stamp office jumping to conclusions from data in its electronic benefit transfer
system? Id. § 273.18(a)(1)(ii).
2. Was the overissuance correctly calculated?

Did the food stamp office apply all applicable
income exclusions under 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d)
and 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(b)(5), (c)? Did the food
stamp office properly disregard amounts of
income that could not be anticipated with reasonable certainty on the basis of information
known to the household twenty days before the
food stamp office determined the household’s
benefits for the month in question as 7 U.S.C.
§§ 273.10(c)(1), 273.12(a)–(c) require? See id.
§ 273.18(c)(1)(ii)(A).
3. Does the claim include stale amounts? The

food stamp office must exclude any benefits
issued more than six years before it “became
aware of the overpayment” and (except in the
case of an intentional program violation) may
exclude benefits issued more than twelve
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months before it became aware of the claim. Id.
§ 273.18(c)(1)(i).
4. Did the food stamp office properly offset
any underissuances or expunged benefits?

This should include the amount by which the
household was underissued during the period for
which the overissuance took place. The food stamp
office should thoroughly review its records to find
any benefits that might have been expunged from
a household member’s electronic benefit transfer
account. Id. § 273.18(c)(1)(ii)(C), (D).
5. Is anyone in the current food stamp household liable for the overissuance? All adult

members of a food stamp household are jointly
and severally liable for overissuances to that
household, and the food stamp office can
recoup benefits from an entire household even
if only one member is responsible for a prior
overissuance. An individual is not, however,
responsible for a prior overissuance if the
individual was not a member of the overissued
household during the month in question or was
not an adult at the time of the overissuance
(regardless of the individual’s current age). Id.
§ 273.18(a)(4)(i).
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Food Stamp Overissuance Checklist (Continued)
6. Is the claim stale because it was not established in the quarter after the quarter in
which it was discovered? Whether this reg-

ulation is intended to work in favor of recipients is unclear; however, one can also make a
due process claim that excessive delay in establishing claims that the food stamp office knows
it wants to pursue tends to undermine the
household’s ability to defend itself since
records are more likely to be lost, memories
dimmed, and so on. The food stamp office can
hardly claim that the government interest
should allow it to delay establishing the claim
since federal regulations establish the quarterafter-the-quarter standard. Id. § 273.18(d)(1).
7. Would pursuing the claim be cost-ineffective? This is difficult to show if the household can

readily be subject to recoupment from current
benefits but otherwise is worth considering for
relatively small claims. Id. § 273.18(e)(2).
8. Was the notice establishing the claim legally
sufficient? A notice that is vague or silent on the

reason for the claim, the method by which it was
calculated, or the opportunity to have the claim
waived may violate federal regulations. Id.
§ 273.18(e)(3)(iv); see Mayhew v. Cohen, 604 F.
Supp. 850 (E.D. Pa. 1984). A notice that is vague
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on the consequences of failing to respond may
violate due process (or may be insufficient to preclude a later challenge to the validity of the claim).
See generally 7 U.S.C. § 2022(a)(1) (establishing
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s authority
to settle, compromise, or deny claims); 7 C.F.R.
§§ 271.2, 271.4(b) (delegating that authority to
state food stamp agencies). Also, under Bliek v.
Palmer, 102 F.3d 1472 (8th Cir. 1997), notices
concerning claims should inform households that
they have the right to request that the claim be
waived even if the food stamp agency would be
disinclined to grant such a waiver. See Ellender v.
Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (similar principles applied in Supplemental Security
Income context).
9. Should the claim be reduced, compromised,
or waived for inability to pay? The economic

circumstances of many low-income households
make repaying overissuances a serious hardship.
7 C.F.R. § 273.18(e)(3)(iv)(M), (7)(i).
10. Did the food stamp office fail to retain
proper records relevant to the claim?

Without these records, the household may be
unable to defend itself properly against the
asserted overissuance. Id. §§ 271.2(e)–(f),
273.2(f)(6).
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